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Asserting Mineral Rights Against the United
States Government in Federal Court
ROBERT C. COATES*
WILLIAM B. GRANT**
INTRODUCTION

It is commonplace to decry the proliferation of federal agencies,
and the thousands, perhaps millions of decisions each agency

makes annually, each decision affecting one or more individuals
in a myriad of aspects of latter twentieth century life. Relief from

most of these decisions-when it is available at all-usually comes
under the auspices of the judicial review provisions of the Admin-

istrative Procedure Act.1 This is surprisingly terse legislation, considering its potential reach and impact, and, as will be explained

more thoroughly below, it is usually the start of the inquiry rather
than the end.

This Article will outline in concrete and detailed form 2 the pro-

cedural steps and pitfalls involved in an attempt to seek judicial
review of a particular type of agency decision: namely, the invalidation of a mining claim by the Department of the Interior. Other
types of agency decisions or orders may, of course, require different steps in seeking redress in the courts. Each aspect of judicial
* Judge, Municipal Court of San Diego, California; Adjunct Professor, University of San Diego School of Law; B.S., Geology, San Diego State University, 1959;
J.D., California Western School of Law, 1970; Active Member of the following organizations: Sierra Club, San Diego Natural History Museum, the California Mining
Association, and the Natural Resources Law Professor's Section of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation; Assistant Editor and Author, American Law ofMining
II; Director, San Diego Ecology Center, President, Eagle Scout Alumni Association
of San Diego.
** Associate, Robert C. Coates, Inc.; Compliance Investigator, State Department of Education; Assistant Editor, Judicial Review Section, American Law ofMining; B.A., Michigan State University, with High Honors, 1966; J.D., Western State
University, Honors, 1979; LL.M., Taxation-in progress, University of San Diego.
1. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1976).
2. A "nuts and bolts" treatment of this topic has not been previously undertaken, hence the present effort.
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review discussed below-jurisdiction, 3 venue,4 or the statute of
limitations 5-must be addressed when seeking review of any
agency decision, although the conclusion, or "answer," under each
category may differ. To that extent, what follows may serve as a
paradigm for the appeal of agency decisions in general.
I.

BACKGROUND

Mining claims are property rights to certain types of mineral
land within the public domain. The granting and vesting of these
rights are governed by the United States Code.6 The manner in
which mining claims are staked, and the way the rights are perfected or patented has remained essentially unchanged since 1872,
although the Federal Land Policy 7and Management Act imposed
recordation requirements in 1976.

When dealing with this topic it is particularly important to understand that unpatented mining claims, even though considered
vested and freely alienable property rights, may be invalidated by
the Department of the Interior and the Bureau of Land Manage-

ment on several grounds. The most common ground for invalidation is lack of a "discovery," a term of art which refers to the8
sufficiency of mineral values that justify the staking of a claim.
Additionally, invalidation may occur for lack of compliance with
other statutory requirements for the continuing validity of a
claim. 9

The invalidation process typically begins as a contest brought
by a local office of the Bureau of Land Management, although

private parties may also bring such proceedings.' 0 An initial determination of invalidity may be made with or without a hearing,
depending on the nature of the case.II An appeal of the Bureau's
decision may be had before the Interior Board of Land Appeals
(IBLA), generally without a hearing.' 2 The decision of the IBLA
3. See infra notes 15-32 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
6. 30 U.S.C. (1976).
7. 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1976). (Provides for filing and recordation of unpatented
lode or placer claims; failure to do so will constitute abandonment of a claim).
8. 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1976). See Shell Oil Co. v. Andrus, 446 U.S. 657, 661-62
(1980) (whether oil shale would qualify as a valuable discovery under current mining
law). See also Lawson v. United States Mining Co., 207 U.S. 1, 13 (1907).
9. 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1976); United States v. Iron Silver Mining Co., 128 U.S. 673,
676 (1888) (a misrepresentation made by an applicant for a patent allows government
to set aside patent).
10. 30 U.S.C §§ 612-13 (1976).
11. 43 C.F.R. § 4.415 (1982) provides that an evidentiary hearing on issues of fact
may be granted within the discretion of the Board, upon request by a party.
12. 43 C.F.R. § 4.452-59 (1982).
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is necesis defined by regulation as "final agency action," which
13
sary for the invocation of the judicial review process.
What follows is a discussion of the most troublesome areas for
the lawyer who wishes to file a complaint for judicial review in
federal court. Where applicable, references are made14to the sample complaint to be found at the end of this Article.
II.

AVAILABILITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW JURISDICTION

When judicial review is desired, the first task is to establish with
utmost care which statutes govern the form and substance of the
planned review. While the Administrative Procedure Act applies
without question to the review of the Department of Interior's decisions which affect mining claims, 15 other specific agency statutes
may either restrict or enlarge its provisions.1 6 The Administrative
Procedure Act, however, is the only statute governing judicial review of an invalidation of a mining claim.17 While specific regulations of the Department of the Interior set forth elaborate
provisions for Public Land Hearings and Appeals within the
agency,18 neither statutes nor regulations make provision for judicial review of those decisions other than to define "final agency
action."19
Since a lawyer who practices mining law will turn almost exclusively to the Administrative Procedure Act in order to seek judicial review of the Secretary's decisions, attention must be paid to
the jurisdictional limitations of that act which were recently imposed by the United States Supreme Court in Calpfano v. Sanders.20 Despite an array of circuit decisions generally balanced to
the contrary, the court decided in Sanders that the Administrative
13. 43 C.F.R. § 4.21(b)(c) (1982); see generally 1 AMERICAN LAW OF MINING
§§ 1.45-1.47 (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Found. ed. 1983).
14. See infra Appendix A.
15. 43 C.F.R. § 4.21(b) (1982). Coleman v. United States, 363 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.
1966), adheredtoon reh., 379 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1967), rev'don othergrounds,390 U.S.
599 (1968), reh ' denied,391 U.S. 961 (1968), conformedto in, 405 F.2d 72 (1968), cert.
denied,394 U.S. 907 (1969).
16. See, e.g., Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1276
(Supp. V 1981) provides for review in a district court depending on location and circumstance of decision; Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § 816 (Supp. V 1981)
provides review either in the court of appeals where violation occurred or in the court
of appeals of the District of Columbia.
17. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1976). 43 C.F.R. § 4.21(b) (1982) refers to trial agency
action being subject to judicial review.
18. 43 C.F.R. §§ 4A00-4.478 (1982).
19. 43 C.F.R. § 4.21(b) (1982).
20. 430 U.S. 99 (1977). The applicant for social security disability benefits had
failed to seek judicial review within the time limit established by the jurisdictional
social security statute 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976). He then tried to use the Administrative Procedure Act to obtain jurisdiction to seek later review.
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Procedure Act did not provide an independent grant of subject
matter jurisdiction for judicial review, but rather served as a
blueprint for review procedure once jurisdiction was obtained
elsewhere.
The Sanders court suggested that the recent 1976 amendment to
the Code which removed the $10,000 minimum for invoking federal question jurisdiction 2' made that statute a serviceable vehicle
for obtaining jurisdiction in a complaint for review of administrative action. 22 Subsequently, the court in Andrus v. Charleston
Stone Products Co.,23 clearly affirmed that jurisdiction in an action to review the invalidation of a mining claim can indeed be
properly predicated on federal question jurisdiction. The Sanders
decision apparently has not limited the availability of judicial review in the area of mining law, although it is important to be
aware of the theoretical basis of that decision.
Despite the presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action, 24 the practitioner should also be aware that some
decisions of the Secretary may not be reviewable (through the Administrative Procedure Act) because they are made under permissive type statutes such as the Mining Claims Occupancy Act,25
which commits actions to the Secretary's discretion and authority
thereby making review unavailable. 26
The basis for invoking jurisdiction of the federal courts must be
alleged in the complaint. 27 As noted above, the Administrative
Procedure Act is no longer considered a viable basis for invoking
federal question jurisdiction.28 A shot-gun approach to jurisdictional allegations is advised, so that in addition to federal question
jurisdiction, any other conceivable basis for jurisdiction should
also be alleged. Occasionally, a statute, otherwise separate from
mining law, can affect mining claims and provide an alternative
base for jurisdiction. The 1976 Mining in the Parks Act,29 which
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976).
22. Sanders, 430 U.S. at 105.
23. 436 U.S. 604, 607-08, n.6 (1978). See 28 U.S.C. § 133 1(a) (1976).
24. Tooahnippah v. Hickel, 397 U.S. 598, 605-07 (1970).
25. 30 U.S.C. §§ 701-09 (1976).
26. Lutzenhiser v. Udall, 432 F.2d 328, 329 n.A (9th Cir. 1970) (the classification
of lands was committed to the Secretary's discretion--therefore not reviewable); Mollohan v. Gray, 413 F.2d 349, 351-52 (9th Cir. 1969) ("with a permissive type statute
even where an applicant meets all the statutory requirements, the Secretary still has
discretion to refuse to act. Discretionary action under a permissive statute is exempted from judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act"). See United
States v. Walker, 409 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1969). (The statute uses the word "may,"
making a decision by the Secretary discretionary).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). See Appendix A, Paragraph II.
28. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
29. 16 US.C. §§ 1900-1912 (1976) (special statute for mining claims within the
National Parks).
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directs the Secretary to begin discovery contests against mining
claims situated in certain national parks, and which contains a
separate jurisdictional section for seeking judicial review, is a
good example. 30 The Tucker Act3 ' may also provide jurisdiction
where the loss of a mining claim can be translated into a dollar
equivalent. Furthermore, mandamus 32
jurisdiction may be available, depending on the circumstances.
III.

VENUE

Unlike jurisdiction, the basis for laying venue in a particular
district court need not be alleged in the complaint. An improper
choice of venue, however,
will probably trigger a motion to dis33
miss by the government.
The basic venue statute applicable to challenges of administrative action dealing with suits against United States agencies and
its officers was added in 1962.34 Formerly, actions against the
Secretary of the Interior had to be filed in Washington, D.C.3 5

The 1962 amendment broadened the scope of venue choices to
include the district where the defendant resides,36 the district
where the cause of action arose, 37 the district where any real property involved is situated,38 and 39the district where plaintiff resides
if no real property is involved.
Since a mining claim is considered real property, 40 the district
of the plaintiffs residence is unfortunately excluded from the
scope of venue in most instances. 41 Thus, in most actions which
challenge the Secretary's decision in reference to a mining claim,
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1910 (1976) (jurisdiction for review provided in federal district
court).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976). The act confers district court jurisdiction for certain
non-tortious civil claims arising under the laws of the United States. Only monetary
damage may be redressed.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976) (an action in mandamus lies when the circumstances
call for an officer or employee of United States "to perform a duty owed to plaintiff'); Wilbur v. United States ex rel Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 318-19 (1930) (Action in
mandamus was proper when claimant had complied with statutory prerequisites and
secretary had no discretion as to claimants rights within the meaning of statute); see
also State of S.D. v. Andrus, 462 F. Supp. 905 (D. S.D. 1978), aff'd,614 F.2d 1190 (8th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied,449 U.S. 822 (1980); Mollohan, 413 F.2d at 352 (mandamus is
proper only to command an official to perform a ministerial act).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1976).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976).
35. See Annot., 9 A.L.R. FED. 719, 723-24 (1971).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1) (1976).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(2) (1976).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(3) (1976).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(4) (1976).
40. See supra note 6.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (venue lies where plaintiff resides "if no real property is
involved in the action.")
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the choice of venue is between the District of Columbia, where the
Secretary resides, and the district where the mining claim is situated.42 However, it may be possible to join a subordinate official
of the Bureau of Land Management or other applicable agency in
order to add the district of that official's residence to the venue
choice.
Since judicial review of mining decisions is generally limited to
the administrative record below, and therefore requires no further
fact-finding by the court, 43 it seems to be a triumph of form over
substance that the statute removes the district of plaintiffs residence as a venue choice, simply because a mining claim is characterized as real property. Regardless of which district has venue,
the review will be of the administrative record, and defended by
the local United States Attorney's Office. The location of the
claim is of little or no consequence to the court. Nevertheless, the
present statutory scheme is quite clear, and an attempt to lay
venue in plaintiffs district of residence, when the mining claim is
located in another district, will in all probability be met with
a
4
successful motion to dismiss or a motion to change venue.
When improper venue is subject to a successful motion to dismiss by the government, the plaintiff should argue for transfer to
another district in order to avoid the danger of a lapsed statute of
limitations and the additional expenses of re-filing and re-serving
the complaint. 45
IV.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

It is crucial to isolate the particular statute, if any, that provides
for judicial review of a particular decision of the Secretary. Often
that statute will also set forth a timeline for contesting that decision in the federal courts. 46
However, for most Board of Land Appeals decisions invalidating mining claims, there are no statutory or regulatory provisions
47
which specify a timeline for seeking an appeal in the courts.
Moreover, the Administrative Procedure Act itself sets no timeline
42.
43.
44.
45.

See, e.g., Pruess v. Udall, 359 F.2d 615, 617-18 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1976).
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) (1976) (the code provides the district court

with power to transfer "in the interest of justice . .

.")

46. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 1276 (Supp. V 1981), providing for a sixty-day time
limit for seeking review of Secretary's disapproval of state programs under 30 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1328 (Supp. V 1981); see also 43 C.F.R. § 3000.5 (1982), which mandates that
any action contesting the Secretary's decision as to gas or oil leases must be taken
within ninety days.
47. "There is no statute of limitations for judicial review of an administrative
decision by the BLA." United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981).
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for seeking of judicial review.48
A surprisingly beneficial effect of the absence of particular provisions for judicial review of departmental decisions is that there
need be no concern for a "deadline," subject to the equitable principles generally associated with estoppel or laches.4 9 Where equitable principles control the timeline, governmental reliance on a
decision adverse to the client, such as the remodeling of a park on
the site of an invalidated claim, is a factor to be considered in

making a timely bid for judicial review.
V.

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

Exhaustion of administrative remedies, that is, the pursuit of
the appeals process within the agency to a final departmental decision, should also be alleged in the complaint,50 and it is an established principle that courts will review agency action only after
the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.5 '
The Board of Land Appeals, like most agencies which have an
administrative appeals process, will not pass on the constitutionality of its enabling legislation.5 2 This agency restraint may raise an
issue as to whether the exhaustion of the administrative appeals
process is necessary in those cases where the only issue to be litigated is the constitutionality of a statute or regulation.5 3 Nevertheless, the doctrine of exhaustion is generally departed from only
in infrequent cases where immediate and irreparable harm can be
shown 54 or where the administrative remedy would be inadequate
or where the administrative agency
or otherwise futile to pursue,55
56
has exceeded its jurisdiction.
Since the regulations of the department generally provide for
the suspension of operation of a decision during the administra48. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).

49. Plested v. Abbey, 228 U.S. 42, 50 (1913); United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d at
979 (availability of review is subject to general principles of estoppel); First National
Bank v. Roeland Park State Bank & Trust Co., 357 F. Supp. 708, 712 (D. Kan. 1973).
50. See Appendix A, Paragraph IV. 43 C.F.R §§ 4.21, 4.400-4.415 (1982) for appeal procedures provided by the Office of the Secretary of the Interior.
51. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938); Doria
Mining & Engineering Corp. v. Morton, 608 F.2d 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 962 (1980).
52. See, e.g., Lynn Keith, 88 I.D. 369 (1981) (constitutionality of recordation provisions of Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976).
53. See, e.g., Saint Regis Paper Co. v. Marshall, 591 F.2d 612 (10th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828 (1979), reh ' denied, 444 U.S. 974 (1979) (exhaustion required for constitutional challenge).
54. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 196-201 (1969).
55. Oil Shale Corp. v. Udall, 235 F. Supp. 606 (D. Colo. 1964).
56. Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Dev. Corp., 295 U.S. 639, 647 (1935) (the action
by the Secretary was beyond the authority of the statute).
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tive appeals process, 57 lessening the chance of harm, only an unlikely case would provide a clear basis for seeking judicial review
without exhausting the departmental procedure.
VI.

A.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Exclusiveness ofAdministrative Record

Except in limited circumstances, the reviewing court looks only
at the administrative record, and will not consider evidence extrinsic to the administrative proceedings. One well established exception to this rule exists where fraud has been alleged in the
actual administrative adjudicatory process in which case the reviewing court will accept evidence relevant to the fraud issue.5 8
In addition to fraud, any irregularity in the administrative process might justify the introduction of new evidence to the reviewing court. In a recent case, 59 the reviewing court decided a factual
issue on affidavits submitted in support of a summary judgment
where the factual issue was raised in briefs before the agency, but
the agency had failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing. 60 In
Mendenhall v. United States,6' the reviewing court looked at the

new evidence which had been offered to the Board in a request to
reopen in order to determine whether the IBLA
had abused its
62
discretion in refusing to reconsider the case.
B.

Limited Review of Question of Fact

Although it appears that the scope of review of agency findings
of fact has broadened since the passage of the Administrative Pro-

cedure Act, 63 cases in which administrative factual findings have

been overturned are quite scarce, and the practitioner still faces a
decidedly uphill battle when seeking judicial review of factual
issues.

The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes findings to be set
aside if unsupported by "substantial evidence."
Courts have
given various interpretations to this phrase, perhaps the most pre57. 43 C.F.R. § 4.21(a) (1982) (Except as otherwise provided by law or other pertinent regulation, a decision will not be effective during the time in which a person
adversely affected may file a notice of appeal).
58. DoriaMining, 608 F.2d 1255, 1258 (1979). See also Linn and Lane Timber
Co. v. United States, 236 U.S. 574 (1915).
59. Foote Mineral Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 81 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
60. Id at 87. (The court did not remand for more procedure since the agency
had made its decision based on facts which it did not dispute.)
61. 556 F. Supp. 444 (D. Nev. 1982), afja, 735 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1984).
62. Id at 450.
63. Annot., 5 A.L.R. FED. 566, 593-96 (1970).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976).
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cise being "enough evidence supporting the Secretary's decision to
justify, if it were a jury trial, a refusal to direct a verdict against
him. ' 65 In regard to factual issues, the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of the Administrative Procedure Act is used interchangeably with the "substantial evidence" test.66 When applying the
substantial evidence test to the administrative record, courts will
not "weigh" the evidence. 67 In practical terms, this approach
means that even when a particular agency finding is contrary to
the weight of the evidence as perceived by the reviewing court,
that finding will not be set aside so long as there is substantial
evidence to support it.68

Given the limited judicial review accorded questions of fact, the
practitioner should exert maximum effort during the administrative hearings in support of factual issues favorable to the claimant.
Once a factual issue has been adversely decided, attention should
be paid to those procedural factors which permit the introduction
of new evidence. 69 Finally, the practitioner should be alert to decisions where the agency's application of law to the facts may be
attacked, rather than the factual finding itself, thus bypassing the
"substantial evidence" standard in favor of the more ample review
accorded legal issues. 70
VII.

FEDERAL COURT PROCEDURE

It goes perhaps without saying, that both the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the local rules of the chosen filing district are
applicable to a complaint for judicial review when it is filed in a
federal court. This section will highlight a few practical points of
this procedure.
A) Before filing, check local rules as to the number of copies
which must be filed. Also check the Federal Rules for the filing fee.
B) Service
must be accomplished in the following three
ways. 71
65. Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 618-21 (1966).
66. 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). See Mendenhall,556 F. Supp. at 449. See, e.g., Multiple
Use, Inc. v. Morton, 353 F. Supp. 184 (D. Ariz. 1972), aff, 504 F.2d 448 (9th Cir.
1974).
67. Foster v. Seaton, 271 F.2d 836 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Mendenhall,556 F. Supp. at
449.
68. Roberts v. Morton, 389 F. Supp. 87 (D. Colo. 1975), affd,549 F.2d 158 (10th
Cir. 1977).
69. See supranotes 58-61 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Baker v. United States, 613 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1980), cer. denied,
449 U.S. 932 (1980) (the court invalidated a "too much" test the Secretary had used in
making his decision); see generally Annot., 5 A.L.R. FED. 566, 576-92 (1970).
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(D)(4), 4(D)(5).
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1) By personal service on the U.S. Attorney in the district
of chosen venue, and,
2) On the Attorney General of the United States, at the
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., 20503, by certified or registered mail, and,
3) On the offending officer(s) or agencies themselves, also
by certified or registered mail.
C) As to naming parties: Prior to 1976, to name and serve
"The Department of the Interior" or the "United States,"
rather than the Secretary of the Interior in his official capacity,
rendered a72complaint vulnerable to the defense of sovereign
immunity.
As amended in 1976, the Administrative Procedure Act abolishes the defense of sovereign immunity in cases within its purview.73 However, it is still better practice to name the Secretary
in his official capacity, since it avoids the additional risk that a
complaint may fail to plead itself within the scope of the Administrative Procedure Act and thereby fall vulnerable74to the
immunity defense under another jurisdictional statute.
D) The administrative record, consisting of all pleadings and
decisions in the administrative appeals process, should be filed
with the complaint as Exhibits.
E) Motion Practice. Once the complaint has been filed, it is
likely to be the subject of a number of motions and the familiarity with the rules of motion practice for the local district is
very important.
1) Motion to Dismiss. Government motions to dismiss
may be based on improper venue, lack ofjurisdiction, failure to comply with a statute of limitations, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and sovereign immunity,
75
all of which have been substantively discussed above.
2) Motion to Dismissfor Improper Party or Service. The
statute under which suit is brought sets forth who one must
or may sue.76 However, as long as no applicable statute of
limitations has run after the Secretary receives improper
service, the
parties will be allowed to amend their
77
pleadings.
3) Motion to Dismissfor Failureto Exhaust Administrative
Remedies. The regulations describe the appeals procedure
within the Department of Interior.78 They mandate spe72. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 27.07 (1958 & Supp. 1970);
see also Chournos v. United States, 335 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1964).
73. 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1976).
74. See, e.g., Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.denied, 452
U.S. 905 (1981) (sovereign immunity defense still valid under 28 U.S.C. 1331 "federal
question" jurisdiction).
75. See supra notes 26, 44, 48, 50, 51 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. See also FED.R.CIv.P. 25(d)
for substitution of parties upon succession to the office of Secretary.
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 15.
78. 43 C.F.R. § 4.21 (1982).
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cifically that parties must exhaust Departmental
appeals
79
before qualifying for judicial review.
4) Motion to PreventFurtherDiscovery. In confining a litigant to the record below, the government, in addition to
arguing nonexhaustion of remedies, will likely be able to
prevent further discovery. Plaintiffs counsel may, for example, move for leave to depose the "deciding official,"
possibly an Assistant Secretary of the Interior. The government can and most likely will object to such a request
because testimony
not contained in the record below is not
80
relevant.
5) Motionfor Summary Judgment. Except in the rare case
of a de novo trial, a motion for summary judgment will
result in a final disposition of a complaint for judicial review. Where with no further factual input, there exists no
triable issue of fact, the entire determination will be based
on the administrative record.8 ' The court recognizes that
the question of whether an agency's factual finding is "unsupported by substantial evidence" within the meaning of
the Administrative Procedure
Act is itself a question of law
82
and not one of fact.

79. 43 C.F.R. § 4.21(b) (1982); 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976).
80. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
82. But see Nickel v. Morton, 501 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1974), which requires,
where there are conflicting facts, that the reviewing court indicate which operative
facts in the record constitute substantial evidence.
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APPENDIX A
SAMPLE COMPLAINT
Whitney C. Lindley
Attorney at Law
4800 Gold Lode Tower
Denver, Colorado 80203
(303) 233-3138
Attorney for Plaintiffs
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DEBORAH J. GARTNER
) Civil No. 10-888
and LEE D. GARTNER,
)
) COMPLAINT FOR REVIEW
Plaintiffs, )
) OF ADMINISTRATIVE

)
)

DECISION

)
)
)

(5 U.S.C. § 702)

)

v.
WILLIAM CLARKE,
SECRETARY OF
THE INTERIOR,
in his official capacity,
Defendant.

)

)
)
)

This is an action for judicial review of a decision by certain
officers and agencies of the United States Department of the Interior (herein referred to as "the Department") declaring plaintiffs
asbestos mining claims null and void for lack of a valuable
discovery.
II
The jurisdiction of this court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 1331, 28 U.S.C. Section 1361, and 16 U.S.C. 1910.
III
Plaintiffs are owners of asbestos mining claims known as Tar
Asbestos Claims, One through Ten, located pursuant to 30 U.S.C.
22 in 1955 in the northwest portion of Death Valley National
Monument, in Inyo County, California. In 1976, the park was
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closed to entry and location under the mining laws by 16 U.S.C.
1901 through 1911.
IV
Pursuant to 16 U.S.C. 1905 of the same 1976 legislation, the
Department was directed to begin proceedings to determine the
validity of mining claims already established within the park's
boundaries. Accordingly, a contest against Plaintiffs' claims was
initiated by the Department on June 2, 1979 before Administrative Law Judge E. Kendall Clarke (Transcript: Exhibit A of original complaint.) Plaintiff and Department submitted briefs
(Exhibits B and C of original complaint.) A decision as to that
contest was rendered on May 6, 1980 (Exhibit D of original complaint), declaring Plaintiffs' claims null and void for lack of a valuable discovery. Plaintiffs duly appealed from that decision to the
Interior Board of Land Appeals (Exhibit F of original complaint.)
On July 8, 1981, the Board affirmed the decision (Exhibit G of
original complaint). Having thus exhausted all administrative
remedies, plaintiffs now seek judicial review of the Board's decision as to Tar Asbestos Claims Number One and Two.
The departmental decisions invalidating Plaintiffs' mining
claims for lack of a valuable mineral discovery are arbitrary and
capricious and are not supported by substantial evidence on the
administrative record pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706, and especially
in the following particulars:
A. (Exhibit D, page 9) Judge Clarke based his determination as to the value of the asbestos found on Plaintiffs' claims
on a seven-hundred and twenty (720) ton figure. As more
thoroughly explained in Exhibit E, pages 7 and 8, that figure
is less than one-fifteenth of the figure that a fair reading of
the hearing transcript would justify.
B. The primafacieburden of showing lack of discovery was
not met by the government in this contest since government
examiner John Jones based his opinion as to the marketability of plaintiffs' claims on the totally arbitrary assumption
that a minimum fifteen (15) million tons of asbestos are
needed for a profitable operation. (Exhibit E, pages 4-5)
C. The decision of the Board (Exhibit G) arbitrarily and incorrectly declared the decision of Judge Clarke final as to
plaintiff DEBORAH J. GARTNER's former husband and
son, named in all stages of the administrative proceedings below. (Exhibit G, page 3)
D. Plaintiffs herein incorporate by reference all arguments
in Exhibit E, Statement of Reasons for Appeal, pages four
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through nine, showing that s to the issues of marketability,
demand, and economic viability of Plaintiffs' discovery, the
administrative decisions are arbitrary, capricious, and not
supported by substantial evidence in the record.
VI
Plaintiffs request a trialde novo on the issues of lack of discovery and marketability of Plaintiffs' claims, pursuant to statutory
authority in 16 U.S.C. § 1910.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that this court:
1. Review and reverse the decision of the Board invalidating Plaintiffs' mining claims.
2. In the alternative, pursuant to 16 U.S.C. 1910, award
Plaintiffs reasonable and just compensation for the taking of
said mining claims.
DATED: 4/8/84
Respectfully submitted,
WHITNEY C. LINDLEY
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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